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THE IMMEDIATE FALLOUT OF WARDS COVE
by Judith Reed"
"One wonders whether the majority still believes that race
discrimination... is a problem in our society, or even
remembers that it ever was."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Blackmun's lament, set forth in his dissenting opinion in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,2 communicates what is wrong with each
of the decisions discussed today. The Court has clearly turned its back on
racial minorities. Nowhere is that more evident than in the Wards Cove
decision; indeed, the opinion makes clear that the Court's majority has not
only turned its back, but also has turned the tables on minority-plaintiffs.
In Wards Cove, a decision that stands in stark contrast to the more than
eighteen years of precedent that it threatens to overturn, the Court, in a
five to four opinion, performed surgery on the allocation of burdens of
proof in a disparate impact case. This article discusses the holding and
how it has been applied by the lower courts, prefaced by a brief summary
of the prior case law.
The Supreme Court first addressed the legality, under title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, of practices neutral on their face but discriminatory
in application in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4 There the Court considered
whether title VII prohibited an employer from requiring a high school
education or successful completion of a standardized test, where those
requirements disproportionately disqualified black applicants.5 In an
unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that
such practices could indeed violate title VII, without regard to whether the
* Counsel, New York City Districting Commission; Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., New York, New York (on leave of absence). B.A.,
Boston University; J.D., Columbia University School of Law.
1. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
2. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5. Id. at 426.
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employer had any intention to discriminate.6
Griggs concluded first that title VII forbids the use of non-job
related tests, job requirements, and other selection criteria, if they have a
significant adverse impact on minorities or women.7 Where such disparate
impact exists, it is irrelevant whether an employer acted with a
discriminatory motive.' The Court held that "[tihe touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited."9
In Griggs, the burden was on the employer to show that "any given
requirement [bore] a manifest relationship to the employment in
question."" The Court made clear that it was incumbent on the employer
to justify the use of a practice with a discriminatory effect.1 In Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 2 the Court emphasized that upon a showing of a
prima facie case of discrimination an employer must meet the burden of
proving that its tests are job related. 3 In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 4 which
dealt with minimum height and weight requirements for prison guards, the
Court insisted that an employer prove that the challenged requirements are
job related. 5 Five years later, the Court reiterated that an "employer
must . . . demonstrate that any 'given requirement has a manifest
relationship to the employment in question'... .16 Thus, Griggs and its
progeny established a specific order and method of proof in a disparate
impact case, specifically allocating the burden of proof on specific issues
between the two adversary parties to the litigation. First, the plaintiff must
6. See id. at 436 (Brennan, J., not participating) ("[A]ny tests used must measure the
person for the job and not the person in the abstract.").
7. Id. at 431 ("Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed [in title VIII.").
8. Id. at 432 ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.").
9. Id. at 431.
10. Id. at 432 (emphasis added). "What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices
and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of
job performance." Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 432.
12. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
13. Id. at 425.
14. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
15. Id. at 329.
16. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (emphasis added) (quoting Griggs,
401 U.S. at 432).
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establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that the disputed
requirement or requirements had a significant adverse impact on minorities
or women.17 Second, where a prima facie case has been so established,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that the requirement
is job related.' Third, if the employer succeeds in doing so, the plaintiff
can still prevail if he or she can show that some alternative requirement
would be equally efficacious from the employer's perspective without
entailing the objectionable adverse impact. 9
II. THE DECISION IN WARDS COVE
In Wards Cove, plaintiffs sued an Alaskan salmon cannery alleging
that a number of practices, including nepotism, word-of-mouth hiring, a
rehire preference, separate hiring channels and a lack of objective hiring
criteria, had resulted in a racially stratified workforce." The unskilled
cannery jobs were filled predominantly by Filipinos and Alaskan Natives.2'
The noncannery jobs, filled predominantly by white employees, ranged
from semi-skilled, such as cooks and construction workers, to skilled, such
as machinists, quality control inspectors and boat crews.2 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' held that this showing of "racial stratification
by job category . . . was sufficient" to support an inference of
discrimination in hiring practices.' Thus, since plaintiffs had made out
a prima facie case of disparate impact in hiring,25 the circuit court
remanded for the district court to determine whether the employer had
satisfied its burden of proving that any disparate impact caused by its
hiring and employment practices was justified by business necessity.
26
Before the district court could act on remand, the Supreme Court granted
17. Id.
18. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425.
19. Id.
20. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2120 (1989). Not only was
the workforce racially stratified, but nonwhite employees lived and ate in segregated
quarters, which were inferior to those assigned to whites. This anachronistic situation led
Justice Stevens to comment that the industry's characteristics "bear an unsettling
resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy." Id. at 2128 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
21. Id. at 2119.
22. Id. at 2119 n.3.
23. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 444.
26. Id. at 445.
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certiorari and subsequently reversed and remanded the case.27 In so doing,
the Court redefined the tripartite Griggs test,2 making it considerably
more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail, by shifting much of the employer's
burden to plaintiffs.29
Under Wards Cove, the prima facie case consists of two subparts.
First, the plaintiff must show a disparity by making the proper statistical
comparison, that is, the comparison must be between those occupying the
at-issue jobs and those who are qualified for the positions." Wards Cove
makes clear, as have the lower courts for many years, that proof of a prima
facie case requires that the plaintiff must ordinarily show what impact the
employment requirement(s) actually had on qualified actual or potential
applicants for the position at issue.31 Plaintiffs may look to some other
broader pool only if the needed skills may be readily found within the
general population, 32 the application process itself is tainted by
discrimination,33 or there is no application process at all.
Had the Court refrained from going further than holding that
plaintiffs had to do more than show mere racial stratification in the
workplace to establish a prima facie case,5 its holding would have
generated little, if any, controversy.' This is because there was arguably
support for this first prong of the prima facie case.37 Unfortunately, the
Court did not stop after this holding but went on to add further elements
27. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
29. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
30. Id. at 2121.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2121 n.6. (where the jobs are unskilled, general labor market or census data
may be acceptable).
33. See id. at 2122 n.7.
34. See generally SCHLEI & GROssMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 570-
84 (2d ed. 1983).
35. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2122.
36. As Justice Stevens points out in his dissenting opinion, it would have been
appropriate for the majority to have ended its opinion at this point and allow the district
court to consider whether plaintiffs' evidence could meet this prima facie case requirement,
according to the circuit court's direction. Id. at 2127 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
id. at 2135-36 ('I agree with the Court of Appeals that when the District Court makes the
additional findings prescribed today, it should treat the evidence of racial stratification in
the work force as a significant element of respondents' prima facie case.') (citation
omitted).
37. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist.
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (statistical evidence showing a disparity in hiring
minority teachers was enough to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination).
[Vol. VII
WARDS COVE
to the prima facie case.
After Wards Cove, even if the plaintiff makes the proper statistical
showing, it is no longer sufficient to allege that a number of practices may
be responsible for the disparity. To satisfy the second part of the prima
facie case, the plaintiff must show "causation" by both identifying the
specific practice(s) at issue and showing that the identified practice in fact
caused the observed disparity.' "[T]he plaintiff is . . . responsible for
isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are
allegedly responsible for any observed disparities." 9 Plaintiffs must then
"specifically show[] that each challenged practice has a significantly
disparate impact on employment opportunities for whites and
nonwhites."'
Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the employer
has an opportunity to offer a justification for the challenged practice(s).
Under Griggs, a prima facie showing of impact shifted the burden to the
employer to show the policy was based on business necessity.Z For this
Court, three things have changed.
First, the burden that shifts to the employer is no longer one of
proof, but one of production. Second, the "touchstone" is no longer
business necessity,' but instead is a "reasoned review of the employer's
justification for his use of the challenged practice."45 The employer need
38. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
39. Id. at 2124 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994
(1988)).
40. Id. at 2125 (emphasis added). In answer to any argument that the "specific
causation requirement is unduly burdensome," Justice White points to the liberal discovery
provisions of the federal rules and the record keeping requirements of EEOC regulations.
See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.18
(1988). Yet, in the same breath, the Court notes that in the case under consideration, the
Wards Cove Packing Co. would not have to maintain records on its employees, because
of an exemption for seasonal employment. See id. at 2125 n.10 (relying on 29 C.F.R. §
1602.14(b)).
41. Id. at 2125.
42. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
43. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. While acknowledging that some of its earlier
decisions could be read as suggesting otherwise, the Court went on to say, disingenuously,
that those cases "should have been understood to mean an employer's production - but
not persuasion -- burden." Id. (citation omitted).
44. As Justice Stevens points out in his dissenting opinion, in Griggs the "touchstone"
was "business necessity," which was viewed as a "weighty" burden, requiring the employer
to show that the practice was essential to effective job performance. Id. at 2132 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2126.
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only produce evidence that in some significant way, the challenged practice
serves legitimate employment goals.4 The effect of this is to place the
burden on the plaintiff -- the party with less access to the evidence -- to
prove a negative, that is, to show that the practice does not serve the
employer's legitimate goals.
Third, if the employer is successful in producing evidence of
justification, as in pre-Wards Cove law, the plaintiff may still prevail by
either "disproving an employer's assertion" or showing that an alternative
selection without adverse impact could achieve the same goal.47 However
difficult this showing might have been before Wards Cove, it will be
virtually an impossible task after the decision. This is because the Court
encumbers this showing with a requirement that the alternative device must
be "equally effective" as, and be of no greater cost or burden to the
employer, when compared with the practice at issue.' Finally, the Court
holds that even where the plaintiff is able to make the necessary causal
connection, the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff.49
III. THE WATSON DECISION
A major source of this distortion of the law on disparate impact
was the majority's deliberate blurring of the distinction that had existed for
years between disparate treatment and disparate impact."0 The first
inkling that the Rehnquist wing of the Court was moving in this direction
surfaced in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.5 There, the Court held
for the first time that disparate impact theory could apply to challenges to
subjective practices, as well as objective practices such as written tests. 2
The Court did so, based on its opinion that "our decisions in Griggs and
succeeding cases could largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis were
applied only to standardized selection practices."3 Having decided the
46. Id. at 2125-26. While a "mere insubstantial justification" is not adequate, the
challenged practice need not be "essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's business.
Id. at 2126.
47. Id. For example, in the case of a test, the plaintiff might show flaws in an
employer's validation study. Failing that, the plaintiff could attempt to show that another
type of test with less adverse impact would select competent workers.
48. See id. at 2127.
49. Id. at 2126.
50. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 989-91.
53. Id. at 989.
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only issue on which the Court granted certiorari, 4 the Court reached out
to discuss allocation of the burdens of proof, which preceded a parallel
discussion in Wards Cove." The Court viewed its holding as an extension
of disparate impact analysis that had to be accompanied by safeguards
against the possible result that employers, finding it too difficult to defend
subjective practices, would resort to quotas to avoid litigation.36 Those
safeguards, according to the plurality, should include requiring that the
plaintiff isolate specific practices and prove a causal connection between
the disparity and those practices."
The concurring opinions in Watson58 and dissenting opinions in
Wards Cove59 explain why the allocation of burdens of proof are different
in the two types of cases. In a disparate treatment case,' the focus is on
the motive of the employer.61 Thus, to make out a prima facie case of
disparate treatment in, for example, hiring or promotion, a plaintiff need
only show that: (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was
qualified for an available position; (3) he was rejected; and (4) the
employer continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications.6' The
purpose of the prima facie case is to "create a presumption of unlawful
discrimination by 'eliminat[ing] the most common nondiscriminatory
54. The Court phrased the issue as follows: "[W]e must determine whether the reasons
that support the use of disparate impact analysis apply to subjective employment practices,
and whether such analysis can be applied in this new context under workable evidentiary
standards." Id.
55. Justice O'Connor's opinion, setting forth the burdens of proof which became law
after Wards Cove did not garner sufficient support in Watson, presumably because Justice
Kennedy, a member of the Wards Cove majority, did not sit on the Court when Watson
was decided. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented from this aspect of the
Wards Cove decision, while Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, cautioned that it
was "unwise to announce a 'fresh' interpretation of our prior cases applying disparate-
impact analysis to objective criteria," in the absence of findings by the district court on the
employer's explanation for its use of supervisor discretion in that case. Id. at 1011
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 993 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 994-95.
58. See id. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Such a case presents "the most easily understood type of discrimination" where
"[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race
.... " International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
61. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (shifts
burden of proof to employer).
62. Id. at 802.
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reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.'"'3  Because "[tihe burden of
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous,""
the burden that shifts to the employer in such cases is merely to "articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"' for the negative action. The
plaintiff may then show such reason to be pretextual." The ultimate
burden of persuasion properly remains with the plaintiff:
In a disparate treatment case there is no
"discrimination" within the meaning of Title VII unless the
employer intentionally treated the employee unfairly
because of race. Therefore, the employee retains the
burden of proving the existence of intent at all times...
ST]he employer may undermine the employee's evidence
but has no independent burden of persuasion.' 7
In contrast to "a claim of intentional discrimination, which the [prima facie
case] factors establish only by inference, the disparate impact caused by an
employment practice is directly established by the numerical disparity."
8
Thus, "[tihe plaintiff in such a case already has proved that the
employment practice has an improper effect; it is up to the employer to
prove that the discriminatory effect is justified."' The Wards Cove
majority ignores this crucial distinction.
We have now seen how the Court arrived at this juncture. In
order to weigh the likely impact of this extraordinary revision of prior case
law, we need to look at how the lower courts have interpreted Wards Cove.
Five courts of appeals and a number of district courts have had occasion
to apply Wards Cove. The decisions indicate problems ahead for plaintiffs
63. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)
(quoting in part Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981)).
64. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
65. Id. at 254.
66. Id. at 255-56.
67. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit
similarly noted "[t]he crucial difference between a treatment and an impact allegation is
the intermediate burden on the employer." Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d
1477, 1485 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
69. Id. See also Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[W]hen
an employer is faced with sufficient proof of disparate impact, its only recourse is to justify
the practice by explaining why it is necessary to the operation of a business. Such a
justification is a classic example of an affirmative defense." Id. at 2131. See also id. at
2131 & nn.15-17 (discussion of how the various treatises on evidence, from 1872 to the
present day, support the Griggs allocation of burdens of proof).
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in each aspect of the Court's holding, with the possible exception of the
first prong of the prima facie case, requiring the proper statistical
comparison.70 The cases are inconclusive for purposes of predicting the
long-term impact, primarily because the cases were tried before Wards
Cove. However, several courts of appeal view Wards Cove as substantially
changing the law, and district courts will undoubtedly adapt their readings
of the decision accordingly.
IV. THE PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN To SHOW CAUSATION
This second prong of the prima facie case essentially opens the
door for courts to more easily dismiss the plaintiff's case where there is a
multicomponent selection procedure. Cases which applied the Griggs
allocation of burden of proof are currently being remanded to be analyzed
under the Wards Cove allocation.
In Allen v. Seidman,1 the defendant argued that "the plaintiffs
had failed to pinpoint particular aspects of [a three-day oral and written
selection procedure] that were unfavorable to blacks."' The Court
responded that "nothing in the structure of a disparate-impact case requires
such pinpointing; whether the reason for the test's disparate impact can be
identified is merely another issue bearing on the correct interpretation of
the plaintiffs' statistics."73 Plaintiffs satisfied the causation element of the
70. Because the need for a proper statistical comparison arguably had to be satisfied
before Wards Cove, those cases where the plaintiffs lost on that basis would have likely lost
even if Wards Cove had not been decided. See, e.g., Hill v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co.,
885 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs made a bare bones showing by simply comparing
12% black carmen with only 1 black foreman out of 25); Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration
Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs had failed to make the proper
comparison, ie., between those on the clerical pool who were qualified to be supervisors
and those who had been appointed). But see Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 379-80 (7th
Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs not required to take into account all possible differences in the
candidate pool).
71. 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989).
72. Id. at 381.
73. Id. See also Lu v. Woods, 717 F. Supp. 886 (D.D.C. 1989). "Neither [plaintiff]
himself nor his proof at trial has specified precisely what it is about AID's method of
evaluating and promoting its employees that has produced the alleged disparity." Id. at
891. There the district court pointed out that plaintiff had not introduced evidence of
other Asian-Americans or what caused them to be excluded from higher positions at AID.
Id. See also Harris v. Lyng, 717 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1989). The court held that "despite
the potential for racial discrimination by the all-white [selection committee] plaintiff has
failed to show the necessary causal connection between the [committee's] actions and any
claimed discrimination," because the committee did not select but merely recommended
individuals for promotion. Id. at 875 (citation omitted).
Stop. 1990]
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prima facie case here because it was not difficult to imagine how a
selection procedure in which objective standards were absent may have
harmed black applicants. 74
This same sort of logic was followed by the district court in Sledge
v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,75 which refused to vacate its 1975 liability
determination in light of Wards Cove. 6 The court held that the
identification by plaintiffs of the uncontrolled, subjective discretion of
defendant's employment officials as the source of the discrimination shown
by plaintiffs' statistics sufficed to satisfy the causation requirements of
Wards Cove."
The Second Circuit also appears to have taken Wards Cove to
heart.78 In a pre-Wards Cove opinion, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Joint Board of the
Electrical Industry, the district court had granted the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) motion for partial summary judgment
on disparate impact claims that the JAC'ss high school diploma
requirement discriminated against blacks and that its age limitations
discriminated against women, noting that it was "not necessary for plaintiffs
to explain the disparity on which their prima facie case rests; they must
only show that its existence is more probable than not."81 Because of this
language the Second Circuit concluded that the district court's decision
"appears not to conform to the applicable legal standard" under Wards
Cove.' The Second Circuit vacated and remanded for further
proceedings in light of Wards Cove, which clarified that the EEOC bore
the initial burden of demonstrating not only race and gender disparities but
74. See Allen, 881 F.2d at 381.
75. 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,537, at 60,496 (D.C.N.C. 1990).
76. Id. at 60,499.
77. Id. at 60,498. The record here showed that the tests used by the defendant were
normally not given until after a decision to offer employment to an applicant had already
been made, and that blacks did as well on the tests as whites. Defendant's personnel
officers were unable to explain the statistical disparities with defendant's personnel officers
offering only that they tried to hire the 'best qualified people." Id.
78. See EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of the Joint Indus. Bd. of the Elec.
Indus., 895 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1990).
79. Id.
80. JAC is the joint labor-management board that administers training programs for
apprentice electricians in the New York City metropolitan area. Id. at 87.
81. Id. at 91 (quoting the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York). Relying on applicant data and census data, the EEOC showed that there was
a substantial disparity between the applicants pool and the acceptance rate of blacks and




also a causal nexus between those disparities and JAC's diploma and
maximum age requirements."'
In Lowe v. Commack Union Free School District,' plaintiffs
challenged, in an age discrimination suit, the New York Board of
Education hiring procedure, which consisted of an interview and writing
sample test.5 Finalists were interviewed by principals whose
recommendations were accepted." The court of appeals held that
plaintiffs failed to show disparate impact, while also questioning whether
the plaintiffs adequately identified a specific employment practiceY
"Under Wards Cove and Watson, [plaintiffs] cannot satisfy the requirements
of a prima facie case simply by broadly attacking as discriminatory the
hiring process as a whole."' The court went on to note, however, that
even if plaintiffs' attack were to be viewed as a challenge to the practices
that narrowed the pool of candidates, it still failed based on the statistics
presented."
V. THE EMPLOYER'S BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION
Probably the most troubling aspect of the Court's decision is its
redefinition of the employer's burden of justifying the practice producing
the racial disparity.' In framing this aspect of the evidentiary analysis
along the lines of Burdine, rather than Griggs, the Court has sent a message
to the lower courts.91
That message has not been lost on those lower courts that have
had occasion to apply this aspect of the Wards Cove test. In Hill v.
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit read Wards Cove
as having overruled the existing law in the circuit on this issue, since "the
83. Id.
84. 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989).
85. Id. at 1367. Defendants acknowledge that interviewers had considerable discretion
in conducting the interviews. Id.
86. Id. at 1367-68.
87. Id. at 1370.
88. Id. at 1371.
89. Id. at 1371-72. The facts showed that applicants over the age of forty were
actually overrepresented in the candidates selected. Moreover, while the court found that
internal applicants under forty fared better in the interview process, the overall results did
not show a disparity that was significant, in part because of small sample size problems.
Id. at 1372.
90. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
91. Id. at 2126-27.
92. 885 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1989).
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employer merely has the burden of production [after plaintiff has made out
a prima facie case] .... ""
In Allen v. Seidman," Judge Posner observed that Wards Cove
"modified the ground rules that most lower courts had followed in
disparate-impact cases" in part by "return[ing] the burden of persuasion to
the plaintiff, while leaving the burden of production on the employer, and
also dilut[ing] the 'necessity' in the 'business necessity' defense .... ""
Indeed, under Wards Cove the term "business necessity" defense is "now a
misnomer, since the 'defense' does not require a showing of necessity and
is no longer an affirmative defense[]. "' The court suggests that the
doctrine be renamed the "issue of legitimate employer purpose."'
Because of the change in the nature of the employer's burden announced
in Wards Cove, "after that decision the prima facie case means less than it
did before, so there is less reason to be fussy about it. Under the regime
of Wards Cove it just makes the defendant produce some evidence in
justification of its test, after which the plaintiff must prove the test
unreasonable.""
The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case under the standards adopted in Wards Cove and had also
"mounted a powerful attack" on defendant's justificatory evidence." The
court appeared to agree with plaintiffs that the challenged test was poorly
designed and administered, and noted that the test had been abandoned
shortly after the suit was filed.1"
Despite all this evidence undercutting the employer's asserted
business justification, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case because the
district court appeared to have placed the burden of persuasion on the
defendant." 1 However, there is a suggestion that the plaintiffs' evidence,
although compiled pre-Wards Cove, might be sufficient to meet plaintiffs'
93. Id. at 812 n.12.
94. 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989).
95. Id. at 377.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 381.
98. Id. at 379.
99. See id. at 380.
100. Id. ("The evidence supports the district court's findings that there were no set
questions, no set right or wrong answers, no fixed passing grade, no instructions for
weighting performance on the various parts of the exam, no fixed time limits for the
individual sessions, and no evaluation of the panel members."). Further, the test arbitrarily
emphasized some aspects of the job over others and failed to test many of the tasks that
would be performed. Id. at 380-81.
101. Id. at 381.
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burden after Wards Cove.' The appellate court held that the only issue
open on remand is whether the employer had a legitimate purpose in using
the challenged test."'
In a companion case, Evans v. City of Evanston,1" the issue on
appeal was whether defendants' physical agility test for the job of
firefighter "serves a legitimate interest of the employer" under the changed
"ground rules for disparate impact litigation [announced in Wards
Cove]." ° Affirming the prior finding that the test itself was fine under
the relaxed standard of Wards Cove, the court turned to the question of the
defendants' methods of scoring the test. °6
Under Wards Cove, the employer has the burden of producing
evidence that the test itself, and the method of scoring used, serves a
legitimate employer purpose." To this end, the employer must produce
evidence that the method of determining who passed the test in question
was related to the city's need for a physically capable firefighting force.
108
The Seventh Circuit characterized the city's evidence on this question as
"feeble."' °  However, the failure of the city to justify the method of
scoring, when viewed in light of their production of justificatory evidence
relating to the test itself, is not enough to warrant failing to place the
burden of persuasion on the plaintiff."' The case was then remanded to
permit the district court to determine "whether, with all the evidence in,
the plaintiff proved ... that the test, because of its method of scoring, did
not serve the legitimate ends of the employer but instead unreasonably
excluded women.""'
In Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp.,1 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the
challenged practices were justified by legitimate business purposes under
Wards Cove and Watson."' An industrial relations expert and a retired
102. Id. at 377-81.
103. Id. at 381.
104. 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989).
105. Id. at 383.
106. Id. at 383, 384.
107. Id. at 384.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 384-85.
110. Id. at 385.
i1. Id.
112. 890 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 740. The plaintiffs attacked Gulf Oil's seniority system, including the
manipulation of certain lines of progression, and the use of promotional and hiring tests
having an adverse impact on black employees. Id. at 737-38.
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personnel official testified that the lines of progression were restructured
to increase efficiency and that the changes conformed with industry
practices at the time.114 This evidence apparently was sufficient to satisfy
the employer's burden "to produce evidence, but not to prove, that the
'challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer. ' ' 15
With regard to the tests, in probably the most striking departure
from pre-Wards Cove law, the Bernard court appears to adopt a rule that
"employers are not required, even when defending standardized or
objective tests, to introduce formal 'validation studies' showing that
particular criteria predict actual on-the-job performance."16
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit considers the justification burden to
have been transferred to the plaintiff in Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration
Supply Co." In Mallory, the court of appeals held that after a prima
facie showing, plaintiffs would then be required to "prove that the
proffered justification for the practice does not serve any legitimate
employment goals of the employer."'
But in Green v. USX Corp., 9 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
while allowing that "Wards Cove may have relaxed the employer's burden
to rebut the prima facie case,"'2 did "not read the decision as requiring
[it] to accept at face value an employer's explanations of the adverse
impact of its hiring practices on blacks."'
Finally, in Sledge v. JP. Stevens & Co.," the court stated that,
"[a]s a result of Wards Cove we now know... that in the face of a prima
facie case the employer's burden, even in a disparate impact case, is simply
one of production and not of proof."' However, "[t]he nearest the
defendant came to producing evidence that its hiring practices were
dictated by business necessity was the testimony of one of its witnesses that
114. Id. at 741.
115. Id. at 740 (quoting Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126).
116. Id. at 742 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998
(1988)).
117. 882 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1989).
118. Id. at 912.
119. 896 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1990).
120. Id. at 805.
121. Id. The employer defendant had argued that its hiring system enabled it to select
the best qualified employees and that blacks had just "dropped out" of the process more
often than whites. See Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 275-77 (E.D.
Pa. 1983).
122. 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,537, at 60,496 (D.C.N.C. 1990).
123. Id. at 60,497-98.
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defendant simply endeavored to hire the best qualified people to fill
vacancies in its work force."12A This was not sufficient to shift the burden
back to the plaintiffs?15
VI. PLAINTIFFS' SHOWING OF AN ALTERNATIVE SELECTION
PROCEDURE
Most cases are resolved at the second stage of the tripartite
evidentiary analysis.1" This is likely to be as true before Wards Cove as
after. But after Wards Cove, given the Supreme Court's addition of the
requirement that the proposed alternatives be "equally effective" as the
challenged practices in meeting the employer's legitimate objectives, it may
be expected that no plaintiffs will meet this burden."z
In Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., ss the Fifth Circuit rejected a
proposed alternative to restructuring lines of progression, as well as a
proposed alternative to promotional tests.1 9 The court stated that "[t]he
Supreme Court has made it clear that by 'equally effective' it meant an
alternative practice that would serve the employer's business purpose fully
as well in terms of utility, cost, 'or other burdens' of the proposed
124. Id. at 60,498.
125. Id. at 8. See also EEOC v. 0 & G Spring and Wire Forms Specialty Co., 732
F. Supp. 72 (N.D. IU1. 1990). The district court found that the employer had provided
legitimate business reasons for relying on word-of-mouth recruitment by showing it got a
source of workers that were willing to work at low pay, ie., Polish immigrants with
technical training. In so doing, the court overturned its previous rejection of that
justification and an earlier liability finding, after Wards Cove, because the burden had been
placed on the employer. Id. But see EEOC v. Andrew Corp., 51 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 39,364, at 59,537 (1989). The district court upheld a challenge to word-of-mouth
recruitment from a primarily white workforce. The court found that the practice did not
serve legitimate goals, expressed by the employer as inevitable and least costly. The court
rejected that defense as "weak evidence," based in part on the company's willingness to
advertise in suburban papers. Id. at 59,441-42.
126. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2128-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the
tripartite evidentiary analysis in disparate impact cases consists of: (1) a showing by plaintiff
that the employer-defendant's employment practice has a disparate impact on minorities;
(2) a rebuttal by the defendant showing that the practice is one of "business necessity"; and
(3) if the practice is one of "necessity" a showing by the plaintiff that another system would
serve their ends without having as harmful an impact on minorities). Disparate impact
cases rarely, if ever, progressed to the employee rebuttal stage since a cleat burden was put
on the defendant to show that the practice be 'manifestly" related to the employment in
question. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982).
127. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
128. 890 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1989).
129. Id. at 744.
Stop. 1990]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
alternative device."'
In International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc. ,31 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the burden was to
show any alternative selection practice which was as "economically and
technically feasible" and equally effective. Here, the plaintiffs did not
produce evidence of any alternative and the Court upheld the company's
"fetal protection policy" that excluded all fertile women from certain
hazardous jobs."'
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Carolina Freight
Carriers Corp.,"' a case involving the alleged disparate impact on
Hispanic applicants for truck driver positions of a "no-conviction" policy,
the district court rejected the EEOC's attempt to show that a policy which
barred applicants who had convictions within five to ten years of applying
would serve the employer's purpose of minimizing its employee theft
losses."M The district court concluded that since the employer showed
that its employee theft losses were lower than others in the industry, the
EEOC had failed to meet its burden of proving that its alternative was
"equally effective or [would] have a less restrictive effect."135
VII. CONCLUSION
While a review of these opinions is inconclusive, they highlight the
disturbing aspects of Wards Cove. First, in this delineation of the
allocation of the burdens of proof, the Court moves closer to an intent
standard which is directly contrary to its earlier readings of title VII and,
130. Id. (citing Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127).
131. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
132. This case is mentioned here only as an example of an interpretation of this Wards
Cove requirement. However, if the Supreme Court holds, as it should in my opinion, that
a policy that applies to women only is not facially neutral, this case would not be
susceptible to a disparate impact analysis.
133. 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
134. Id. at 752, 754. The employer's policy prohibited the hiring of applicants who
had ever been convicted of a felony. Id. at 742. The district court also found fault with
aspects of the prima facie case, although plaintiff showed that all six positions at issue were
filled by non-Hispanic applicants and that Hispanics were more likely to be convicted than
non-Hispanics. For example, there were few openings, a lack of evidence on the number
disqualified and no proof of number convicted but qualified otherwise for employment.
Given these statistical gaps, it is likely that this case would have been lost even prior to
Wards Cove. Id. at 745-46.
135. Id. at 753.
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indeed, contrary to congressional intent."' Second, lower courts could
easily conclude that little remains of the employer's burden, because
"reasoned review" comes very close to a "rational basis" test. Is it sufficient
for an employer to simply state that the challenged selection criterion is
the least expensive and simplest method of obtaining the "best qualified"
workers?" 7
Finally, where the employer uses a multicomponent selection
process, how precise must plaintiff's proof be? It is not uncommon for
employers to use several different criteria in making a selection decision;
a combination of tests, for example, or separate height and weight
requirements. In some cases the requirement that the plaintiffs identify a
specific practice and show causation will not be difficult to meet. Where
the employer has records from which all parties can determine how much
an adverse impact, if any, each job requirement may have had, both parties
will have access to the information, and either or both will put it in
evidence.
Under a different scenario, however, after Wards Cove, plaintiffs
will have a much less likelihood of success. Consider the following
example: (1) the employer uses a combination of requirements to make a
hiring or promotion decision; (2) that combination, taken together, has a
net adverse impact on minorities or women; and (3) the employer does not
have records from which it is possible to ascertain which requirement or
requirements are responsible for that adverse impact. Under Wards Cove,
where these three factors are present, the disparate impact claim may well
be dismissed. It is not sufficient that a plaintiff can show that the
employer is making employment decisions in a manner which causes a
substantial adverse impact; the plaintiff under Wards Cove is required, on
pain of dismissal, to demonstrate which of the various specific job
136. In Teal, the Supreme Court notes that "[t]he legislative history of the 1972
amendments to Title VII . . . extended the protection of the Act . . . by deleting
exemptions for state and municipal employers. That history demonstrates that Congress
recognized and endorsed the disparate impact analysis employed by the Court in Grig."
Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8 (citations omitted). The notion that the only discrimination that
should be sanctioned is intentional discrimination is becoming a hallmark of the Rehnquist
Court. See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting challenge to Georgia's
capital punishment statute, despite overwhelming proof of statistical disparities in
administration of the death penalty depending on the race of the victim); City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (no violation of the Voting Rights Act, and the pre-1982
amendments to that act, by at-large elections in absence of proof of discriminatory intent).
137. Such a defense was categorically rejected by the Supreme Court in Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 657 (1978) (employer asserted that allowing a white
superintendent to hire employees, which he knew to be competent, was justified as a
business necessity).
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requirements caused the adverse impact, and to what degree.
The Court justified this "latest sojourn into judicial activism," m
and the changing of long-established ground rules, because a contrary
holding would result in "a host of evils" including the wholesale adoption
of quotas by employers who found the burden of validating subjective
criteria impossible to meet.139
Those who argue that quotas will be the inevitable result of
placing the burden of proof on the employer to justify criteria having a
disparate impact have been unable to substantiate this proposition. If this
result were actually likely, one might expect that eighteen years of
experience under Griggs, as well as experience in those circuits that prior
to Watson had held subjective practices subject to a disparate impact
analysis, would have yielded some empirical evidence to support this
proposition." Yet, neither the Supreme Court nor the Bush
Administration has been able to present such support, preferring
apparently to rely on some abstract common sense notions. What has been
a result of the burden of proof allocation under Griggs was that employers
who relied on tests to hire or promote, reformed those tests, where they
were seen to have a disparate impact on minorities and women.
Employers who wished to avoid litigation sought expert assistance in
constructing fairer tests and in the end obtained a more diverse
workforce."' This kind of progress will halt at a time when elements
such as changing demographics of the workforce, economic need and a
growing atmosphere of racial bias make it most needed. We can only hope
that Congress acts quickly to restore the Griggs standard.
138. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2122 ("The Court of Appeals' theory would 'leave the employer little
choice... but to engage in a subjective quota system of employment selection.'") (quoting
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,449 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). See
also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988).
140. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 984-85.
141. For example, in 1970, only 6.4 % or 23,796 of the 375,494 police officers and
detectives in the country were black, while in 1982, 9.3 % or approximately 47,000 of the
505,000 police officers in the country were black. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CENSUS OF THE POPULATION: 1970, VOL 1, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION,
PART 1, UNITED STATES SUMMARY § 1, at Table 223 (1973).
